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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter examines the long-run evolution of modern entertainment industries such as 
the film and music industries. It investigates ways to conceptualise and quantify the subsequent 
waves of creative destruction, and investigates specifically how sunk costs affect the evolution of 
the industry through its interaction with variety, market integration, product differentiation and 
price discrimination, and how old entertainment formats almost never became extinct. It finds 
that within this framework, four economic tendencies shaped the entertainment industries 
evolution: first, endogenous sunk costs often led to a competitive escalation of production 
expenditures, which we call ‘quality races’, which increased industrial concentration. Second, the 
fact that marginal revenues largely equalled marginal profits led to extreme vertical integration 
through ownership or revenue-sharing contracts, as well as to an oversupply of variety and a 
dual market structure with high-concept blockbuster products and low-budget niche products. 
Third, entertainment’s public good characteristics led to substantial income inequality among 
creative inputs and business models optimising exclusion possibilities in the value chain. Finally, 
the project-based character of entertainment production implied large intra- and inter-industry 
agglomeration benefits and often led to geographical concentration. Dynamic product 
differentiation allowed various old formats to survive the waves of creative destruction, albeit in 
much smaller incarnations. 
Key words: sunk costs, market structure, dynamic efficiency, price discrimination, history, creative industries, motion 
pictures, videogames, music, live entertainment, dynamic product differentiation, quality races, industrialisation, horizontal and 
vertical product differentiation, agglomeration economies, total factor productivity, revealed comparative advantage, variety, vertical 
integration, business models. 
A revised version of this paper will be forthcoming in Candace Jones, Mark Lorenzen and 
Jonathan Sapsed eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Creative and Cultural Industries (Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past two centuries several forms of mass entertainment have become 
industrialised. Motion pictures, for example, were adopted to automate, standardise and make 
tradable live performances, the gramophone to industrialise live music, and videogame consoles 
to industrialise all types of board and card games. Yet new and old forms of entertainment, big-
budget productions and shoe-string projects, homogenous and diverse markets often survived in 
an uneasy co-existence. Music recording did not kill live performances, Hollywood blockbusters 
not the art-house film, and best-seller markets not the enormous diversity of idiosyncratic books. 
The main aim of this chapter is to explain long-run change in the entertainment 
industries, to develop an overarching conceptual framework to understand their dynamics since 
about 1850, especially those of sub-industries such as live entertainment, motion pictures, music 
and videogames. This leads to three research questions: 
What are the defining economic characteristics of entertainment industries? 
How have they shaped historical processes such as concentration, vertical integration and 
agglomeration in film and music over the past two centuries? 
How did they shape the ‘product-space’, the coexistence of old and new forms, big and 
small producers, homogenous and diverse markets? 
This investigation is worthwhile because it yields insight in the process of long-run change 
in the creative industries and might thus help practitioners and policy makers to understand and 
anticipate the shape of things to come.  
In essence, this chapter does three things: it combines an over-arching conceptual 
framework with a focus on long-run change and the analysis of historical evidence. Existing 
works that focus almost exclusively on the first aspect, an over-arching conceptual framework, 
include Vessillier (1973), Heilbrun and Gray (1993, 2001), Scott (2006), Cowen (1998 et al.) and 
Throsby (1979). Literature that deals almost exclusively with the third aspect (analysis of 
historical evidence) includes Wasko (1982), Dale (1997), Le Roy (1990, 1992), Sedgwick (2000) 
and Waterman (2005). Works that address both of these things, but do not explicitly try to 
conceptualise and analyse patterns of long-run change include Vogel (1986-2010), Caves (2000) 
and Hofstede (2000). 
Works that address all three aspects are sparse. They include the monumental total 
histories of the global film industries by the French film historians Jean Mitry (1967-1980) and 
Georges Sadoul (1948-1954; 1972), the work by Kristin Thompson (1985) on the international 
expansion of the early Hollywood industry, the work by Michael Chanan (1980, 1996) on how 
cinema emerged from a range of popular entertainments such as music hall, and Baumol and 
Bowen (1966), who examine the evolution of performing arts’ costs in the Unites States. 
What follows will qualitatively analyse structural change in the entertainment industry 
since c. 1850. First we will look at ways to conceptualise and quantify the subsequent waves of 
creative destruction, and then we will investigate how sunk costs affected industry evolution 
through its interaction with variety, market integration, product differentiation and price 
discrimination. A subsequent section will discuss four economic characteristics that drove the 
evolution of the entertainment industry: how sunk costs led to quality races, marginal revenues 
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equalling marginal profits to vertical integration, quasi-public good characteristics to business 
models centred around points-of-exclusion, and the industry’s project-based character to 
agglomeration. A final section concludes. 
 
II. The process of creative destruction 
II.A. Industrialisation and the shifting production possibility frontier 
During the late nineteenth century, demand for entertainment increased sharply, driven 
by a growth in leisure time, discretionary income, and population. In addition, the demand was 
focused spatially by urbanisation and the growth of rapid local transport networks (Bakker 
2008). 
Stimulated by this booming demand, entrepreneurs adopted new technologies such as 
the phonograph, motion pictures, radio and television to automate and standardise 
entertainment and make it tradable, thus industrialising it. Automation resulted in low and flat 
marginal costs of offering additional viewings, compared to high fixed and sunk costs of making 
the prototype (the film negative, the manuscript), enabling massive scale economies. Thus the 
printing press industrialised handwritten manuscripts and verbal communication, cinema 
theatrical entertainment, the gramophone musical performances, and videogames the playing of 
games. The tradability of performances themselves (performers being shown in many venues 
simultaneously) led to the integration of regional and national entertainment markets. The 
resulting product standardisation homogenised the consumer experience. 
This industrialisation was brought about by several waves of creative destruction that 
swept the industry. Schumpeter (1942) originally introduced the concept of creative destruction 
as the way in which a new way of doing business competes away the old ways and products. 
Creative destruction is intricately linked to dynamic efficiency: an industry can be statically 
efficient if price equals marginal costs (allocative efficiency), and if all firms use the most efficient 
technology available (productive efficiency). Yet a statically efficient industry need not be 
dynamically efficient: it may not develop new products, new processes, new markets, new 
sources of supply or new organisational forms, and herein lies according to Schumpeter the 
defining characteristic of capitalism: that it is never in equilibrium, but always changing from 
one equilibrium to the next, like a person walking. Once one equilibrium is being approached, a 
new better one has become possible, and entrepreneurs jump on the new opportunities 
offered. 
Thus instead of eating away at the margins, creative destruction threatens the very 
survival of entire firms and industries. In many industries one can see waves of creative 
destruction in which a new product sweeps away old products, but in entertainment old 
‘products’ often survived in new, differentiated guises. 
A way to further conceptualise the process is the production possibility frontier (PPF) 
originally introduced by one of Schumpeter’s contemporaries, Gottfried von Haberler (1930).  
Dynamic efficiency is a process in which the PPF is being pushed outwards continuously. 
A PPF can show the trade-off of a society in consuming entertainment and all other products 
(diagram 1). Inside the frontier C-F, say from A to B, we can get more of both goods by using 
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more efficient existing technology. At the frontier, starting from C to D, initially we get lots 
entertainment by giving up a little of all else, but eventually we get less and less additional 
entertainment for an additional amount of other goods we give up.  
 
Diagram 1. Hypothetical production possibility frontier for entertainment and all other 
goods. 
Point D is productively efficient as it is on the PPF, but not allocatively efficient, as it is not 
on the highest utility curve possible, unlike point E, which is both. The second PPF C-G shows 
the effect of dynamic efficiency, brought about by innovations such as motion pictures and the 
gramophone.  
Over the last one and a half centuries a series of innovations shifted the PPF outwards, 
followed by a series of jumps in which the industry moved closer to the PPF, but as it tended to 
reach it, there was not there anymore and the PPF had shifted outwards again.  
In live entertainment, for example, several exogenous innovations ranging from 
urbanisation and steel-frame buildings to the railroads, shifted the PPF outwards, and 
entrepreneurs jumped on it by building high capacity fixed theatres and founding central 
booking offices directing theatre groups by telegraphs over railroads along the most efficient 
routes (diagram 2). Other entrepreneurs built entire movable theatres on boats visiting cities 
along a river.
Entertainment 
↑
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Diagram 2. Qualitative analysis of successive shifts in the production possibility frontier for 
various forms of entertainment. 
 
Theatre circuits 
Exogenous technological 
changes 
First-order outward shift 
of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Second-order outward 
shift of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Steel-frame buildings (early 
19th c.) 
Railways (c. 1840) 
Telegraph (1837) 
Urbanisation (since 18th c.) 
Increasing income 
Switch to measured time 
Steamships 
Deregulation of theatre 
Steel-frame theatres (early 
19th c.) 
Show boats 
Many more theatres 
Stock/repertory theatre 
(same actors, different 
plays) 
Theatre circuits 
Novel additional circuits 
(opera, big and small-time 
vaudeville, burlesque) 
 
 
Motion pictures 
Exogenous technological 
changes 
First-order outward shift 
of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Second-order outward 
shift of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Projection (1654) 
Persistence of vision 
gadgets (1826) 
Photography (1839) 
Celluloid (1868) 
Positives and negatives 
(1887) 
Celluloid sheets (1888) 
Roll film (1888) 
High-sensitivity emulsion 
(1888) 
Motion picture cameras 
(1891) 
Motion picture film stock 
(1891) 
Motion picture projection 
(1895) 
Cinemas (c. 1905) 
 
 
Music 
Exogenous technological 
changes 
First-order outward shift 
of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Second-order outward 
shift of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Spiral spring (15th c.) 
Cylindrical home music 
systems (15th c.) 
Small cylinder music boxes 
with cam, not bells (1796) 
barrel organs (c. 1800) 
Barrel organ books (1892) 
Recording of sound (1850s) 
Engraved interchangeable 
discs for music boxes 
(1870s) 
Recording and playback of 
sound (1873) 
Phonograph (1873) Phonograph and 
gramophone used to 
record and sell music 
(1890s --) 
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Videogames 
Exogenous technological 
changes 
First-order outward shift 
of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Second-order outward 
shift of PPF related to 
entertainment 
Board games (since times 
immemorial) 
Mechanical arcade 
machines (e.g. pinball) 
Microprocessors (1957) 
Computer simulation 
software (1960s) 
Home computers (1977) 
Arcade game machines 
(1970s) 
 
 
Home game consoles 
(various generations since 
1970s) 
 
 
Likewise, for motion pictures seven preconditional technological changes shifted the PPF 
outwards, ranging from projection in 1654 to sensitive emulsions in 1888, and made possible 
the invention of cameras, film stock and projectors. These again shifted the frontier outwards, 
leading to the innovation of fixed cinemas by the mid-1900s, which again shifted the PPF 
outwards, leading to feature films by the mid-1910s, and so on.  
Likewise for music, innovations such as barrel organs, disc-based music boxes and 
recorded sound shifted the PPF outwards, eventually leading to the phonograph. For 
videogames, exogenous technological changes such as board games, pinball machines, 
computer software and microprocessors shifted the PPF outwards and enabled the introduction 
of arcade game machines by the late 1960s, shifting the PPF further outwards and later enabling 
the innovation of home videogames. 
 
II. B. Measuring dynamic efficiency 
A quantitative proxy of creative destruction is the growth in total factor productivity (TFP), 
or how much faster outputs grow than inputs, reflecting a more efficient use of production 
factors. Although few estimates exist, available data for spectator entertainment in the United 
States, Britain and France for the 1900-1938 period show a TFP-increase ranging from 1.1 
percent to 5.4 percent per annum, suggesting that the effect of dynamic efficiency was 
substantial (table 1). In the US, ten times as many spectator-hours were produced per unit of 
labour and capital than in 1900, and in Britain (already highly productive in 1900) about one 
and a half times as many. The U.S. data can be disaggregated into a 7.2 percent per annum TFP-
growth for film and 0.5 percent for live (Bakker 2012), showing that, even while under threat 
from film, live entertainment in 1938 produced 20 percent more output per input than in 
1900.3 Slightly less reliable data for France, show TFP-growth of 4 percent per annum, with 
1938 TFP four times as large as in 1900. These number suggest that dynamic efficiency in 
                                                 
3 In theory, all TFP-growth in live entertainment could be explained by scale economies through increased 
urbanisation (Bakker 2012: 1055-1057). 
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entertainment was larger than in almost any other industry, and studies of the phonograph, 
radio and television would probably further reinforce this finding. 
 
 
 
A second way to proxy an industry’s dynamic efficiency is its revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA): its share in a country’s exports over the world-wide industry’s share in global 
exports. The higher this ratio is above unity, the higher the RCA of the particular industry. Work 
by Nicholas Crafts (1989) shows the RCA for tradable entertainment products in a category he 
called ‘Book and film’ that comprised most media products, including books, magazines and 
records (table 2). 
 
 
The data shows that the ranks varied substantially among countries. In Germany ‘Book 
and Film’ was one of the top-sectors, while in Britain and the US in 1899 it was one of the 
lowest performing sectors. Between 1899 and 1950, however, Book and Film’s RCA in Britain 
Table 1. Contributions to output growth in spectator entertainment, 1900-1938, per cent per annum.
US UK France
Output growth 8.6 3.2 5.9
Contributions
Capital 1.2 0.9 0.8
Labour quantity 2.0 1.2 1.1
All above inputs 3.2 2.1 1.9
TFP 5.4 1.1 4.0
Notes : the capital share is set at 0.25; labour includes both the growth in labour quantity and labour quality.
Source : Bakker (2008); because of unique sources, the US growth rates could be estimated more precisely and
are based on Bakker (2012); they may not be fully comparable with the French and British rates.
Table 2. Revealed Comparative Advantage rankings of tradable entertainment sector, 1899-1950.
1899 1913 1929 1937 1950
Britain 14 13 6 8 10
US 13 10 6 7 6
Germany 1 2 3 4 3
France 3 4 10 3 6
Belgium 13 13 14 10 8
Sweden 10 11 12 13 13
Italy 6 6 8 7 6
Switzerland 8 10 9 8 8
Canada 4 8 8 8 11
Japan 10 8 5 4 6
India 6 7 8 6 6
Notes : tradable entertainment products are labelled 'Book and Film' by Crafts, and comprise the following: 'books, periodicals
and all printed matter, agendas, notebooks and boxed stationery, pens, pencils, toys, games and sports goods, gramophones, 
musical instruments, cameras, optical instruments, films and photographic paper, paintings and works of art.
The table shows the RCA rank of 'Book and Film' within 16 manufacturing industry groups that comprised 'Iron and steel, 
non-ferrous metals, chemicals, bricks and glass, wood and leather, industrial equipment, electricals, agricultural equipment, 
rail and ship, cars and aircraft, alocohol and tobacco, textiles, apparel, metal manufactures, and fancy goods.'
The first number, 14, for example, shows that 'Book and Film' had an RCA that ranked 14 out of the 16 British manufacturing 
sectors in 1899.
Source : Crafts 1989: 130-131.
Rank of tradable entertainment products
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and the US increased considerably, as it also did in Belgium and Japan. The US had the highest 
gain in RCA-rank, followed by Belgium and then Britain. In Germany, France, Sweden and 
Canada the RCA of tradable entertainment declined substantially. Yet, in absolute terms, 
Germany RCA in tradable entertainment remained the highest of all countries throughout the 
period. France, India and Japan held a surprisingly high RCA in tradable entertainment, in many 
years higher than the US, though by 1950 their rank has become the same as that of US Book 
and Film. The high degree of aggregation and the inclusion of non-entertainment products 
makes more precise conclusions difficult. 
Another proxy of dynamic efficiency is the number of new products. This is not always 
easily measurable, although existing studies suggest a sharp increase in variety, based on the 
number of music copyrights registered, films and TV-programmes released, and books 
published.4 We will now turn to the interaction between variety, sunk costs and 
industrialisation. 
 
 
III. Sunk costs and the industrialisation of entertainment 
Sunk costs are incurred once and cannot be recovered when exiting a business. Fixed 
costs are incurred periodically and can usually be avoided. Endogenous sunk costs such as 
advertising or R&D can be chosen by the firm, and do not have a minimal exogenous level. Costs 
such as film production, scouting for and recording of musicians (A&R) or developing 
videogames are endogenous sunk costs because they are incurred once, cannot be recovered 
other than by selling tickets and their level can be chosen (Bakker 2005). 
This section will investigate how sunk costs and variety were affected by the 
industrialisation process, the role of product differentiation, and the relation between sunk costs 
and price discrimination. 
 
III.A. Sunk costs and variety 
The existence of fixed (and partially sunk) costs are the reason we do not have a world of 
infinite variety. Each consumer is unique in her tastes, and the resulting difference in the 
valuation of goods and services makes profitable exchange possible. All consumers’ utility could 
be maximised by crafting entertainment products for each individual, but the existence of fixed 
and sunk costs necessitates the making of entertainment products that are somewhat different 
from each consumer’s optimum (diagram 3). 
                                                 
4 See, for example, figure 6, below. 
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Diagram 3. Stylised relation between sunk costs and variety. 
 
A second, similar trade-off is that between variety and efficiency. In the extreme, zero 
variety (high sunk costs per prototype and low average costs per viewing) maximises efficiency, 
while endless variety (low sunk and high average costs) minimises it. One could envisage, for 
example, only 25 films being produced world-wide annually, satisfying all demandenough to 
see one new film a fortnight, plus a menu of older films. If total consumer expenditure remained 
constant, a massive increase in TFP would take place, as the same output is now produced with 
fewer inputs. In extremis just one film would be made, that consumers would see over and over 
again, ostensibly increasing TFP to orgasmic heights. 
Obviously, consumers enjoy variety and would regard the availability of just one film as a 
massive decrease in output, even if they could watch it many times and in many different ways. 
Each consumer prefers entertainment products fully crafted to their own tastes. The set of 
different media products consumedbooks read, films watched, music listened to is unique 
for every consumer. It is well nigh impossible among the six billion inhabitants of the earth to 
find two souls that have consumed exactly and strictly the same collection of entertainment. 
Economic theory (Krugman 1979) and empirical research suggest consumers strongly prefer 
variety. Broda and Weinstein (2006), for example, find that the benefits of the increasing import 
variety between 1972 and 2001 added 2.6 percent to U.S. GDP. 
The degree of variety that actually materialises in free exchange is per definition sub-
optimal as it does not tailor each product to a specific consumer. It depends on the fixed and 
sunk costs needed to develop the product, but also on an intertemporal information asymmetry: 
distributors do not fully know ex-ante which product will sell and therefore need to distribute 
more than one product to make sure capacity (cinema seats, DVD shelf space, TV time slots) is 
used optimally. Even if consumers would not love variety, the studio would need to produce a 
portfolio of firms to discover the best film consumers like. The mirror image are consumers who 
do not fully know ex-ante how satisfying they will find a specific film, and this also makes 
 Sunk costs
V
ar
ie
ty
 
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tailoring entertainment perfectly to each individual consumer impossible, even without fixed and 
sunk costs. In other words, producers who don’t know what will sell make products for 
consumers who don’t know what they want.  
Only if consumers were completely indifferent to variety  would they be happy with just 
one film being made, as the pleasure of seeing the biggest budget highest pleasure giving movie 
would outweigh the reduction of variety to zero. Although this situation seems far-fetched for 
commercial entertainment products, with experiences such as religious prayers, texts and rituals, 
or with centrally prescribed school textbooks in centrally planned economies, users consumed a 
single prototype many timesand that actually constituted the value of the experience.5 Both 
cases suggest that variety, for better or for worse, is intricately linked with modern capitalism, as 
free exchange is based on everybody having different preferences. 
 
III.B. The effect of industrialisation on variety 
Since 1850 an industrialisation process has shifted household production of many 
different products (songs, plays, poems, home-made toys) with limited fixed costs, and quality 
closely tailored to individual preferences towards a more centralised production of far fewer 
products with high fixed costs and quality less tailored-made (diagram 4).  
At the economy level, two forces were at work. First, new technology such as centrally 
booked, railway-routed theatre circuits, cinema and the phonograph shifted the production 
possibility frontier outwards. Sunk costs per prototype became far higher, but average costs per 
viewing became far lower. At any level of variety, more quantity could be produced. Second, in 
a self-reinforcing process, this stimulated market integration which then in itself further 
stimulated the growth of sunk costs. As a result, at the aggregate level, there was probably less 
variety as a whole in a country, as an enormous archipelago of small islandsthe individual 
householdsproducing a large part of their own entertainment, gave way to national markets 
with concentrated production.  
Diagram 4. Stylised comparison of household versus market production of entertainment. 
 
 Household production Market production  
Fixed and sunk costs Limited costs per prototype High costs per prototype 
Quality Limited quality 
 
Higher quality 
Market size Small and closed 
 
Large and open 
Market integration Low 
 
High 
Differentiation Perfectly differentiated to 
household’s taste 
Imperfectly differentiated 
to household tastes 
Total amount of variety Infinitely many varieties 
produced in total 
A limited amount of variety 
produced in total 
‘Effective’ amount of 
variety 
Limited set available for 
each household given its 
Large set available for each 
household (given that fixed 
                                                 
5 Outside entertainment, an extreme case is standardisation. Consumers all want to drive on the same side 
of the road whether it be right or left, for example. 
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fixed costs costs are ‘shared’) 
Model Traditional 
 
Capitalist / exchange  
Efficiency Lower 
 
Higher 
   
Over all Perfect differentiation, 
limited available variety per 
household, traditional 
productionno market or 
price/quality signal 
Homogenisation, large 
available variety per 
household, market 
exchange price/quality 
signal 
 
At the household level, the extreme product differentiation, in which each household 
made its own products, disappeared. But in return each household had now access to a far 
larger variety of entertainment products, from which it still could choose its own truly and 
strictly unique combination, and of which it now could afford to consume a far larger quantity. 
The fixed and sunk costs per household probably declined, and rising wages increased the 
opportunity costs of household production. In nineteenth century Britain, for example, the 
industrialised areas had the largest provision of commercial entertainment (Sanderson 1984). 
Technological change since the 1950s has made the exogenous sunk costs of producing a 
record, film or book far lower. This should lead to more variety, but was mitigated by a 
competitive escalation of endogenous sunk costs, leading to a dual market structure, with both 
mass-marketed blockbuster products and a second market with an almost infinite variety of 
differentiated products (see section IV, below).  
The evolution of exogenous sunk costs may have followed an inverted U-shape, with the 
difference that the pre-industrial low costs were for isolated submarkets, an infinite archipelago 
of largely autarkic household islands in a national economy, while the present-day post-
industrial low cost products cater for an archipelago of specific ‘isolated’ market segments 
(diagram 5). 
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Diagram 5. Hypothetical evolution of exogenous sunk costs needed for the production of an 
entertainment prototype, pre-industrial times – present. 
 
 
 
III.C. Dynamic product differentiation 
Despite the waves of creative destruction that have swept the entertainment industry 
since the early nineteenth century, old formats often did not disappear but instead reinvented 
themselves. Today theatre plays, musicals and operas are still performed, despite the availability 
of radio, television and internet, because entrepreneurs adopted product differentiation to 
survive creative destruction. 
Product differentiation can take place across many dimensions. Horizontally differentiated 
products are aimed at customers who will not easily switch to another product even if its quality 
increases, such as a pop music fan who never listens to operas no matter how much their quality 
is increased. Vertically differentiated products are clearly viewed as superior over others along a 
dominant quality dimension.  
Informationally differentiated products vary by the extent to which consumers know 
about them, and can be influenced by advertising. As search costs increase with variety (Stigler 
1961), for entertainment products consumer search costs are high. Entrepreneurs attempt to 
differentiate their products informationally by escalating promotional expenditure. Marketing 
costs as share of Hollywood’s production expenditure, for example, are exceptionally high. 
 
Diagram 6. Product differentiation within and between product categories. 
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criterion 
Within 
product 
category  
Within 
same 
product 
A particular 
film: cinema 
 TV etc 
Partially 
coincides 
with price 
discrimination 
Mode of 
viewing; 
point in 
time; (not 
the product 
itself) 
Between 
products 
Dual market 
structure; 
Hollywood 
films vs. art-
house 
cinema 
Less to do 
with price 
discrimination 
Content of 
product 
Between 
product 
categories 
 Opera-first-
class theatre 
– vaudeville 
 motion 
pictures 
Coincides 
with different 
prices but 
also different 
costs and 
different 
products 
Style/format 
of product 
(meta) 
 
 
Within the same product such as a particular mainstream feature film, the differentiation 
criterion is often the means and time of viewing, varying from first-run cinema to television, 
each at a consecutively lower price (diagram 6). Besides mainstream, vertically differentiated 
Hollywood films, there is a second, fragmented market for independent art-house films, 
horizontally differentiated from each other and collectively from the Hollywood films. Between 
product categories differentiation is usually more based on style and format, both horizontally 
and vertically. Some categories such as opera also contain a large club good character when 
they become a way to meet like-minded persons. 
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Diagram 7. Informal comparative ranking of sunk costs and product differentiation across 
various entertainment products. 
 
Industries can be ranked informally by relative horizontal-vertical differentiation and low-
high sunk costs (Diagram 7). Vertical differentiation implies that consumers will turn their backs 
on lower quality products when higher quality products appear, so that producers are 
disproportionately rewarded for a quality increase, which under some conditions leads to quality 
races.6 Horizontal differentiation implies that consumers value variety and that few products will 
obtain a large market share. In practice, in most creative industries products are both vertical 
and horizontally differentiated in varying degrees. The more vertically differentiated, the higher 
endogenous sunk costs can be, as they can be amortised over a larger volume. Products such as 
Hollywood films and videogames are far more vertically differentiated than music, television and 
art-house films. 
This phenomenon of the survival of old media in a different form surfaced time and again 
in the history of the entertainment industry. We will call it here dynamic product 
differentiation.7 Although old formats did not disappear, they also did not stay the same, but 
differentiated themselves in the competition with the new medium. Often they could not offer 
as low prices as the new medium and therefore would focus on a more wealthy audience 
segment (the part of their previous audience with the highest willingness to pay), such as many 
forms of live entertainment did after cinema. Sometimes they could not offer the premium 
quality of the new segment and therefore would focus on an audience with a lower willingness 
to pay or in a different segment, such as free TV after cable TV and radio after television. Radio 
refocused, at sharply reduced advertising rates, on segmented markets and on situations where 
television was not feasible, such as while driving, working or shopping. 
That old media did not simply disappear was partially because of their unique assets, such 
as theatre locations and production know-how. Some of these assets were moved into new 
media. Many theatres converted into cinemas, creative live professionals moved to film 
production, musicians began to make recordings and radio game shows transferred to 
television. Distribution capacity had always been scarce, so old delivery systems could still be 
used to serve specific segments. Each new medium increased capacity and allowed more market 
segmentation, the widest channel focusing on the lowest common denominator.  
Old media output often shrunk in relative terms. Between 1900 and 1938, for example, 
U.S. live entertainment  attendance declined with 1.3 percent a year on average, to sixty percent 
of its original quantity, but in relative terms it had declined far steeper, to only a few percent of 
all spectator entertainment (Bakker 2012). 
An iconic example of dynamic product differentiation is live entertainment. In the course 
of the nineteenth century many new forms developed which still existed in the Boston market in 
1909 (figure 1). The shape of the demand curve, with high price elasticity at high prices and low 
prices, and rather moderate elasticity in between may to some extent explain the time lags in 
dynamic product differentiation. In a discovery process, entrepreneurs had to find out what was 
the demand for new innovative forms of entertainment. The low elasticity in the middle part of 
the demand curve may have slowed down attempts to provide far lower-priced forms of 
                                                 
6 See the section on sunk costs, above. 
7 On product differentiation in motion pictures since 1945, see Sedgwick (2002). 
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entertainment, as many entrepreneurs may have guessed that demand would not increase 
enough to make it worthwhile. Thus it may have taken many historical accidents and 
innovations such as cinema before entrepreneurs ‘discovered’ the responsiveness of demand at 
low prices. This process is not dissimilar to the ‘path dependency’ hypothesis that more efficient 
paths are not taken because the first few steps are unattractive and hide the large pay-offs later 
on. The path taken resulted from the interplay between the entrepreneurial discovery process, 
cost-decreasing technology, and changes in size and geographic density of demand.8 
After the coming of the feature film and of sound, the live entertainment that survived 
did so by differentiating itself. It was either highly artistic and heavily subsidised, or highly 
commercial and high-value added, such as avant-garde theatre or Broadway musicals and plays. 
What lay in between was competed away by cinema. Likewise, after television took over the 
focus on the lowest common denominator, motion pictures focused on a younger, more 
affluent audience, offering more event movies at higher prices. 
 
Figure 1. Ticket price versus cumulative ticket-selling capacity for entertainment venues in Boston in 
1909 ($ and number of tickets). 
 
Source: Boston Committee (1909) as reported in Jowett (1974); see also Bakker (2008). 
 
                                                 
8 On entrepreneurial discovery see Kirzner (1985). 
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Diagram 8. Stylised hypothetical Hotelling ranking of various forms of entertainment, 1890s – 
present. 
 
The above can be illustrated on a classic Hotelling line (diagram 8). If we assume a 
continuum from low- to high-value entertainment, in the 1890s theatre would have been 
somewhere in the middle to maximise revenue. After film arrived, theatre moved upmarket, and 
film would move slightly upmarket as well. Eventually, new technologies occupied more and 
more spots on the differentiation continuum, with cinema and theatre moving further upwards. 
Thus dynamic product differentiation limited the effect of creative destruction. Old format 
were often not completely destroyed by new technology, but instead reinvented itself. 
III.D. Sunk costs and price discrimination 
If a producer-distributor charges a single (monopoly) price for an entertainment product, 
say a film, then revenue may not be enough to cover fixed and sunk production costs, while the 
total surplus, which includes the consumer surplus, would be large enough. This is shown in 
panel A of diagram 9, where price is below average costs. In other words, the producer cannot 
take into account the consumer surplus while setting the budget, and consumers exist that are 
willing to pay a price above marginal costs, but remain unserved. Through price discrimination, 
however, a producer-distributor can charge different prices to different consumers and so 
transform consumer surplus into revenue, enabling higher fixed and sunk costs (panel B in 
diagram 9). With a linear demand curve, monopoly pricing and zero marginal costs, at the 
extreme perfect price discrimination can double revenue and thus sunk outlays.  
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Diagram 9. A stylised example of sunk costs, revenues and average costs with and without price 
discrimination. 
 
Note: the line shows the demand curves, the dotted line marginal costs, the bold line average costs and the surface revenue. 
This necessarily is a simplified example. For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Carlton and Perloff (2003: 219-224) 
and Romano (1991). 
In the nineteenth century, for example, consumers paid a high price to see a new play in 
a metropolitan theatre. Later lower-priced versions were offered by travelling groups and 
resident stock companies, and the smallest communities might be visited by miniature puppet 
theatres (Bakker 2008). 
Nineteenth-century theatre managers were well aware of the need for price 
discrimination. The financing of the rising fixed and sunk costs spent in the railroad, utilities and 
the theatre construction booms, was only possible through large-scale price discrimination. In 
1849, Jules Dupuit (1849: 16, 25), a pioneer of modern utility analysis, mentioned the theatre 
and book publishing as prime examples of price discrimination: 
A single price for tickets will not fill a theatre and might often yield only modest receipts. 
Hence the manager would suffer a pecuniary loss and the public a loss of utility. Divisions 
on the floor of the theatre and differential pricing of the tickets nearly always raise 
receipts as well as the number of viewers. This would be easy enough to understand if 
these divisions merely separated the seats where one can see and hear well from those 
where one cannot. But observation of how a theatre floor is mostly split up in practice 
shows that this is one of the least considerations in pricing the tickets; the theatre 
managers know how to adapt their prices to all the whims of the spectators, those that 
go to see and those that go to be seen, and those that may go for some other reason. 
They are made to pay according to sacrifice they are prepared to make to satisfy their 
whims, and not according to the show they enjoy.  
Likewise, before 1950 motion pictures were released in metropolitan theatres at premium 
prices, then in the main city centre theatres across the country, then in regular theatres, and so 
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on, at ever lower prices, until after a year it ended up for a few cents in ramshackle sixth-run 
neighbourhood cinemas (Sedgwick 2001). After 1950, cinemas reorganised into fewer 
windows, while television, video, pay-TV, cable and free-to-air TV took over the other windows. 
Without such price discrimination, the film could not be made at the given quality. Most 
consumers who see Hollywood films on television can only do so because others were willing to 
pay premium prices to see them sooner in a higher quality medium such as cinema. 
Several studies have tried to quantify price discrimination’s effect.  Leslie (2004), for 
example, studying 199 performances of one Broadway play, found that price discrimination 
increased profits by five to seven percent, and Huntington (1993) that non-price-discriminating 
theatres could increase their revenue by 24 percent if they did. These might be lower bounds, as 
endogeneityroughly speaking a self-reinforcing upward spiralis ignored: if price 
discrimination’s increasing revenues result in higher sunk costs that increase quality, this may 
increase consumers’ willingness to pay and thus allow an increase in over-all prices, as well as 
perhaps an even sharper price discrimination, allowing higher sunk costs, increasing willingness 
to pay, allowing a higher over-all price, and so forth. 
One of price discrimination’s main benefits is to allow in the consumers outside the 
market: those that otherwise would not be in it (Courty 2000). When a production could not be 
made without price discrimination, this might have meant all its consumers would have been 
outside the market.9 
The creative inputs and the owners of the distribution delivery system often have different 
interests. In pop-concerts, for example, performers have an incentive to price discriminate, 
maximisiming revenue rather than attendance. Promoters, however, make most sales from 
concessions, parking and the Ticket Master service charge split, and thus have an incentive to 
maximise attendance and not ticket prices.10 Likewise, cinemas often make most profits from 
concessions and distributors from tickets. Only perfect price discrimination, clearing the market 
and filling every seat serves both interests. These misaligned incentives could explain why actual 
ticket prices and degree of price discrimination are far below levels that maximise performer 
revenue.11 
The importance of price discrimination can be shown quantitatively with an example of 
an average Hollywood movie in the 1990s (figure 2). Ninety percent of revenue came from 
consumers with a relatively high willingness to pay, ranging from $5.50 and above to $0.70 and 
above, and only ten percent from those with a very low willingness to pay ($0.15 and above). If 
all consumers saw the movie at the last (probably perfectly competitive) price, total gross 
revenue would be only $32m instead of the actual $200m and the film could only be made at a 
far lower budget. Even if we assume a single monopoly price is charged of say $0.30, revenue 
would only be $64m, still necessitating a far lower production budget. It is thus very clear that 
consumers that saw the movie at $0.15 could only do so because others saw it at far higher 
                                                 
9 On ticket pricing and price discrimination see also Rosen and Rosenfeld (1997), and Courty (2003a, 
2003b). See also Orbach and Einav (2007) on pricing in cinemas who observe that this used to be very 
differentiated, but is now more uniform. The latter is undoubtedly due to pay, cable and free-to-air 
television as well as videocassettes and DVDs taking over the windows that were previously formed by 
lower-level cinemas.. See also Ekelund (1970). 
10  
11 Billboard, 7 March 2009; see also, for example, Krueger (2005). 
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prices. The audience share of cinema and video for example, was the obverse of its revenue 
share.12 
If we assume a production budget of $40 million and a producer’s share of revenue of 
one-third, it becomes clear that in none of the windows the producer’s price was higher than 
average costs (figure 3), but that when all windows are summed, the effect of price 
discrimination has lifted the producer’s average revenue per viewing substantially above average 
costs. 
If we assume zero marginal cost, a linear demand curve and that for all windows a 
monopoly price was charged, given the producer’s copyright-monopoly, consumer surplus will 
be exactly half the revenue, suggesting that although consumers would have been willing to pay 
$300m for the movie in the aggregate, they needed to pay only $200m, so despite the price 
discrimination still enjoyed a consumer surplus of about $100m. Deriving consumer surplus 
empirically from Figure 2 yields broadly similar results (Table 3). Cinema, with only five percent 
of the audience, accounted for 29 percent of sales and 21 percent of the total consumer 
surplus, while free-to-air television, with 68 percent of audience, accounted for only eleven 
percent of sales revenue, and 29 percent of total consumer surplus. The latter group would not 
have been able to watch the film without the former group with a higher willingness to pay.13 
Without price discrimination, the price per viewing would have been about three dollars, while 
under price discrimination, prices range from as low as fifteen cents to as high as $5.50. Price 
discrimination, in this case, increased sales by $91m and the consumer surplus by $86m (Table 
3). Without price discrimination transforming about two-thirds of consumer surplus into sales 
revenue, the movie could not be made at its existing quality. This fact shapes production in 
many other creative industries and suggests that price discrimination might be welfare 
increasing in creative industries. 
                                                 
12 Including sell-through DVDs in Figure 2 between ‘cinema’ and ‘video’ would not basically change the 
revenue model, as the price per viewing of these was likely lower than that of cinema, given that they 
were generally watched by more than one person and multiple times. 
13 We abstract here from the situation that a portion of viewers will be in both groups. 
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Figure 2. Price versus cumulative number of viewings for a typical Hollywood film, 1990s ($ and 
number of viewings). 
 
Source: calculated from data in Dale (1997). 
 
Figure 3. Producer’s share of ticket price and average costs versus cumulative number of viewings for 
a typical Hollywood film with a $40m production budget, 1990s. 
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IV. Four economic tendencies that drove the evolution of the entertainment 
industries 
 
Four economic tendencies have determined the entertainment industry’s evolution since 
c. 1850: the importance of endogenous sunk costs, the fact that marginal revenues largely 
equalled marginal profits, entertainment’s quasi-public good character, and its project-based 
nature We discuss their characteristics in turn, identify their dynamic implications and assess 
how these expressed themselves historically.14 
 
IV.A. Sunk costs and quality races 
The dynamic implication of endogenous sunk costs is what we call a quality race, a 
market phase in which some firms escalate their sunk outlays in order to obtain a larger market 
share. While in other industries the lower bound concentration may fall to zero as the market 
size increases, because there is ‘room’ for more companies to enter the market, in some 
endogenous sunk costs industries concentration is bounded from below when market size 
grows to infinity, and does not converge to zero (Sutton 1991, 1998). Market growth in such 
industries raises profits for any given quality level, making room for new entrants, but also 
stimulating firms to raise their R&D investmentssuch as film production or videogame 
development outlaysto improve their quality level: while the marginal cost of an increase in 
R&D-spending is unchanged, the marginal benefit from it is now higher, leading to higher fixed 
                                                 
14 For a case study that applies these four tendencies to the evolution of the British entertainment industry, 
see Bakker (2013). 
Table 3. World-wide prices, audience/sales potential and consumer surplus for a typical Hollywood motion picture, 1990s.
Price
($) (1000s) (%) ($1000) (%) ($1000) (%) ($1000) (%)
Cinema 5.50 10,500 5 57,750 29 28,875 21 86,625 26
Video 3.00 34,000 16 102,000 51 42,500 30 144,500 43
Pay television 0.70 24,000 11 16,800 8 27,600 20 44,400 13
Free-to-air television 0.15 147,000 68 22,050 11 40,425 29 62,475 18
Total 0.92 215,500 100 198,600 100 139,400 100 338,000 100
   Cinema and video 3.59 44,500 21 159,750 80 71,375 51 231,125 68
   All else 0.23 171,000 79 38,850 20 68,025 49 106,875 32
No price discrimination 2.99 35,833 100 107,051 100 53,526 100 160,577 100
Effect price discrimination 0.15 - 5.50 179,667 91,549 85,874 177,423
Perfect price discrimination (1.62) 215,500 349,025 0 0 349,025
Notes : the consumer surplus shown is based on rough estimates and simplified assumptions and is for illustrative purposes only. For cinema,
the consumer surplus has been calculated assuming monopoly pricing for the segment and a linear demand curve, making it equal half the sales
revenues; for all other categories it is the surface of the white triangle spaces under the connecting lines in Figure 2.
The 'no price discrimination' case is based on a rough estimate speculatively assuming Figure 2 shows a demand schedule, that marginal costs are zero
and that monopoly pricing applies. The table shows the average of 2 different cases: one with a linear demand curve following the first line segment
in figure 2, the other following the second line segment. An average price of $3.30 under no discrimination equalises the increased sales revenue with
the lost consumer surplus.
Perfect price discrimination sums total actual sales and consumer surplus, which together constitutes sales under perfect discrimination; the average
price is shown.The consumer surplus under perfect discrimination is the sum of the existing surplus and the estimated surplus below the lowest price point 
of $0.15. The latter has been roughly estimated by specualtively assuming the demand curve intercepts the zero price line after 147 million additional
viewings beyond the free-to-air television price point. Total surplus, producer and consumer surpus is the sum of sales revenue and consumer surplus 
under the assumption of zero marginal costs.
Source : Calculated from data from Dale (1997).
Audience Sales Consumer Surplus Total Surplus
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sunk costs and limiting the number of firms as the market tends to infinity. Which of the two 
effects has the upper hand depends on the distribution of the willingness-to-pay and shape of 
R&D-costs associated to quality improvements (Bakker 2005).15 
As the market for films grew, for example, two opposite effects could happen: more 
companies could enter or existing companies could increase production budgets. Which effect 
dominated depended on how easy it was to increase perceived quality through higher 
production outlays and to what extent higher-quality films stole sales from lower-quality films.  
It turns out that, in the motion picture industry, the second effect dominated. With each 
new product category, such as colour film, newsreels or cartoons, a quality race ensued, but also 
ended soon when further expenditures did not yield additional sales anymore. Eventually, in the 
U.S. during the mid-1910s, an escalation phase began which did not have a natural endpoint: 
producers continuously increased expenditure on feature films, yielding ever more ticket sales 
and replacing shorts as the dominant format (figures 4 and 5). European firms could hardly 
participate, as the European home market was disintegrating, and war made venture capital 
almost unavailable, as all capital allocations were targeted at the war effort (Bakker 2000).  
Through a process of entrepreneurial discovery, partially by accident partially by design, 
the industry had stumbled upon a format where the sunk costs could be amplified almost 
continuously because of the disproportionate return to higher quality. Cinemas, for example, 
preferred a higher-quality film, even if lower-quality ones had bargain prices, because they 
needed to earn back cinema fixed costs and because a lower-quality film’s opportunity costs 
were huge. 
A 700-seat cinema, for example, with a production capacity of 39,200 spectator-hours a 
week, weekly fixed costs of $500, and an average admission price of $0.05 per spectator-hour, 
needed a film selling at least 10,000 spectator-hours, and would not be prepared to pay for that 
(marginal) film, because it only recouped fixed costs. Films thus needed a minimum selling 
capacity to cover cinema fixed costs. Producers/distributors could only price down low-budget 
films that passed the threshold level where expected revenues equalled costs. With a lower 
expected selling capacity, these films could not be sold at any price (Bakker 2004).16 
Opportunity costs reinforced this even further. If the hypothetical cinema obtained a high-
capacity film for a weekly rental of $1,200, which sold all 39,200 spectator-hours, the cinema 
made a profit of $260 ($0.05 price X 39,200 spectator-hours = $1960 revenue - $1200 film 
rental - $500 fixed costs= $260). If a film with half the budget and, we assume, half the selling 
capacity, rented for half the price ($600), the cinema-owner would lose $120 ($0.05 price x 
19,600 spectator-hours = $980 revenue - $600 film rental - $500 fixed costs = -$120). Thus, the 
cinema owner would want to pay no more than $220 for the lower budget film, given that the 
high budget film is available ($0.05 X 19,600 = $980  revenue - $220 film rental - $500 = $260 
profit).17 If the high-capacity film were not available, the cinema would only want to pay $480 
                                                 
15 The term R&D is used here for sunk outlays on developing products in the creative industries rather than 
the more general term ‘innovation’, because we are interested here in particular identifiable products with 
a particular amount of money spent on their development, rather than in innovation as a whole. 
16 This is not dissimilar to the quality thresholds, capabilities and minimum quality/cost ratios discussed in 
Sutton (2005). 
17 The relation between production costs and selling capacity is assumed to be linear. Moderate decreasing 
returns would yield the same effect, as would increasing returns. Probably on average, increasing returns 
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for the low-capacity film at most ($980 revenue - $500 fixed costs) in order to break even. A 
film’s ticket-selling capacity could not always be perfectly predicted, but as a film’s release 
progressed and as it was exported to more countries, its appeal became better known (Bakker 
2004). 
In this example a film that costs twice as much earns more than five times as much in 
rentals ($1,200/$220) in case of competition, and more than two and a half times as much 
($1200/$480) without competition. In both cases the high-quality film gets the full rental, while 
the rentals for a low-quality film depend on competitive conditions. Producers thus had a sharp 
incentive to increase costs, making the continuous budget inflation of the 1910s and 1920s 
understandable (figure 4). 
The fixed-costs threshold became lower with each new distribution delivery system. It was 
far lower for television and even lower for internet distribution, meaning that more lower quality 
products could be distributed. Opportunity costs, however, did not necessarily show such a 
decline. 
 
Figure 4. Total annual production outlays for various U.S. film producers, 1913-1927: semi-logarithmic 
scale. 
Notes: all series, except ‘Census’ are scales on the left-hand axis. The DeMille series concerns the outlays of just one producer 
of Paramount and is less comparable to the other series, which are for entire studios or the industry.  
Census = total industry production outlays.  
Sources: see Bakker (2005: 325-326). 
                                                                                                                                                        
were followed by constant returns, and finally by decreasing returns to the last dollars spent on already 
high-budget films. 
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Figure 5. Market size and concentration in the U.S. film industry, 1893-1927: semi-logarithmic scale. 
Notes: the three series are based on three different sources and may therefore not be fully comparable. 
Sources: see Bakker (2005: 329, Appendix I). 
Quality races such as the rise of the feature film in the mid-1910s have happened at 
various points in the entertainment industry’s development. In the 1970s, for example, a new 
quality race started when the ailing Hollywood studios focused on high-concept blockbuster 
movies that were heavily marketed and advertised on television, starting with Jaws in 1975. 
Helped by other factors as well, the studios rapidly reached their former pre-eminence.  
In the music industry since the 1950s, a sharp escalation of firms’ expenditure on Artists 
and Repertoire (A&R) took off, with a few big multinationals focusing on heavily marketing a 
few popular acts while at the same time also achieving horizontal product differentiation 
through a wide range of different labels and acts (Bakker 2011b). Real revenue per music 
copyright increased almost four-fold between 1955 and 1970, a phenomenal average annual 
real growth of about nine percent (figure 6). 
In videogames probably a quality race took place from the mid-1990s onwards, when 
companies started to sink more and more and more outlays in the development of videogames, 
with a few large companies with big distribution organisations becoming prominent (Bakker 
2010). 
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Figure 6. Average real recorded music sales per music copyright registered, new copyrights and all 
copyrights ever registered, United States, 1921-1970. 
 
Notes: Stock = real retail sales / all musical composition copyrights ever registered (the cumulative of the annual registrations, which 
started in 1870, so the 1921 stock consists of all rights registered between 1870 and 1921).  
New =  real retail sales / new musical composition copyright registrations in the year. Retail sales have been deflated using the U.S. 
consumer price index deflator as reported by Officer (2009). 
Sources: Recording Industry of America; Harker (1980: 223-224); U.S. Department of Commerce (1975); see also Bakker (2011b). 
 
 
 
 
IV.B. Marginal revenues are marginal profits 
The second tendency follows from the first. When entertainment products such as film 
tickets, music recordings or video games are sold, all development costs have already been 
incurred and marginal revenue therefore largely equals marginal (gross) profit. This holds, for 
example, for the film producer who sells the film to distributors—each sale is marginal profit—, 
for the distributor who, once it bought the film, sells it on to cinema –owners, and cinema-
owners, who, once having bought the film, sell it to consumers, with every additional chair filled 
being marginal profits. Similar points can be made for many other entertainment products such 
as music, books, or videogames.  
Low marginal costs should lead to very low prices, and thus an inability to incur large 
fixed and sunk costs, were it not that the producer-distributor is granted a monopoly through 
copyright law, and can use price discrimination to transfer some of the consumer surplus into 
revenue, as we saw above. 
In an unintegrated value-chain in which products are sold outright, the producer’s 
incentive to increase quality is limited by the fact that s/he will not get any of the marginal 
revenues that their product generated for the distributor and for the retailer. The classic solution 
has been vertical integration or the use of revenue-sharing contracts. This construction aligns the 
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interests of the participants in the various links of the value chain, and so makes sure that 
marginal retail revenues reach the producer, and this in turn gives the producer the incentive to 
make marginal improvements in product quality that will lead to additional sales, and thus more 
profits, also for the producer. 
In the early motion picture industry, for example, films were sold. This meant that the 
cinema-owner kept their marginal gross profits themselves, and the distributors did the same. 
This made the profit incentive for the film producer small: a good film would lead to some more 
sales at higher prices to more distributors, but the distributors and cinemas would get all the 
marginal profits (Bakker 2003). This circumstance drove vertical integration in the industry, with 
producers often integrating with distributors, the latter sometimes with cinemas, and films 
increasingly being rented for a percentage of revenue rather than sold outright. Distributors also 
started to advance money for film production costs. In France, Pathé already started this 
integration in the 1900s, in the U.S. the Motion Picture Patents Company and General Film 
Company tried to integrate production and distribution and monopolise the film business, and 
from about 1912 the U.S. independents vertically integrated (Bakker 2008). Integration and 
profit-sharing across the value chain shaped the development of many media industries. 
Besides stimulating vertical integration, standard industrial organisation theory suggests 
that constant or falling marginal costs lead to an excessive number of firms. Together with low 
exogenous costs this had led to an enormous variety of media products and a dual market 
structure. In motion pictures, for example, the competitive escalation of endogenous sunk costs 
in quality races led to a vertically differentiated, highly concentrated market for big-budget 
Hollywood films, while low exogenous sunk costs and low marginal costs led to excessive entry 
and a second, separate, fragmented market with an almost infinite variety of films, each having 
a very small market share.18 The latter market appears characterised by monopolistic 
competition: price is above the competitive level, but firms do not make economic profits 
(Chamberlin 1933; Robinson 1933). 
 
IV.C. Quasi-public good characteristics  
Public goods such as national defence are nondiminishable (or nonrivalrous), and non-
excludable: one person’s consumption of it does not reduce the quantity available to others, and 
no persons can be excluded from benefiting from it. Since 1850, entertainment has become 
ever more nondiminishable, but remained excludable. In a theatre, for example, until capacity 
was filled, one additional person would not diminish the entertainment available to others, while 
one additional consumer of bread did diminish the quantity available to others.  
An almost continuous series of technological improvements made entertainment even 
less diminishable. Sharp rises in theatre capacity through steel-frame construction, and later 
cinema and recorded music massively increased the audience a performer could reach. Not only 
radio, television and internet would increase this even further, but also ‘older’ technology such 
as jet travel and large-scale stadiums. Between 1981 and 2003, for example, the top-1 percent 
                                                 
18 Mezias and Mezias (2000) borrow the term resource partitioning from biology to study phenomena not 
unlike both dynamic product differentiation and dual market structure discussed here. 
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of live rock music performers received between 30 and 50 % of the total ticket revenue 
(Krueger 2005:14). 
Yet entertainment forever remained a quasi-public good: nondiminishable but excludable, 
unlike a pure public good as national defence. Throughout the history of the entertainment 
industry, entrepreneurs therefore developed business models that kept price above marginal 
costs by making them own the point where consumers could get excluded and extract all rents 
there. Five major business models were important.  
First, the entrepreneur could exclude visitors from a theatre and so charge a price. They 
could physically exclude people and use their right to set prices to price-discriminate among 
visitors. Second, copyright allowed entrepreneurs a monopoly on their product.  
Third, an important group of entrepreneurs formed the stars themselves, who could 
withhold their services and thus exclude people, depending on the extent of their talent. 
Industrialisation made their performances tradable, and so increased stars’ earning capacity. The 
result was a very unequal distribution of income among the top performers, although exact 
statistics lack to test whether this was actually more unequal that the distribution among live 
performers before film (Bakker 2001; Rosen 1981). The sharply unequal income distribution has 
remained a property of many media industries ever since. This made it also increasingly 
expensive for film makers, especially new entrants, to recruit top talent. Entrepreneurs adopted 
various business models to mitigate this value capture by the stars. The Hollywood studios 
introduced asymmetric long-term (‘seven year’) contracts that allowed them to keep stars’ pay 
limited when they became successful, European firms often used revenue-sharing contracts, 
which limited cash-costs, as pay-outs were only made when cash was coming in. From the late 
1940s, seven-year contracts became unenforceable and a mix of advance payments and 
revenue-sharing is now widely used. 
Fourth, production of diminishable goods such as merchandising that could be sold at a 
premium were used to generate revenue. Fifth, collusion could be a means of exclusion. The 
interwar Hollywood studios, for example, formed a cartel and jointly monopolised resources, 
preventing any firm to bid up star pay.19 Since the collusion and 7-year contracts ended in the 
late 1940s, star pay has risen sharply. 
An example of long-run changes in the public-good nature is the music industry, where 
album sales have diminished and become less excludable because of copying technologies, and 
the new business model depends on the remaining excludable parts, such as live concerts, 
diminishable goods such as T-shirts or deluxe CD-editions, or renting out artists to advertise 
other diminishable goods (Krueger 2005). 
 
 
VI.D. The project-based nature of entertainment 
                                                 
19 In the nineteenth century the global news agencies used the same technique to exclude non-payers. See 
Bakker (2011a). 
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A fourth economic characteristic is the project-based nature of entertainment production. 
Each entertainment product—such as a book, a film, a piece of music—is unique. The making of 
each product is a separate project with unforeseen contingencies, for which different creative, 
technical and commercial talent is assembled. Although every industry contains activities that are 
project-based, the proportion of it in the entertainment industry is extreme (diagram 10). 
 
Diagram 10. Hypothetical representation of the boundaries of the project-based segments of the 
creative industries and various other industries. 
 
The dynamic implication of this is agglomeration. Each project benefits from other 
projects being organised in the neighbourhood, much in the same way as Alfred Marshall 
described agglomeration benefits: within industries, co-location creates a thick market for 
specialised inputs, external economies of scale in production as specialised firms lower costs by 
spreading them over more buyers, and knowledge spill-overs, as talent meets informally, 
circulates between firms and exchanges best practices and ideas.20 
In addition, Jane Jacobs (1969) emphasized the importance of inter-industry externalities. 
Co-location of different entertainment industries would yield similar benefits. In London, for 
example, music, film, radio, television and media financing companies may all benefit from 
being close to each other and therefore being able to better organise projects. Thus the 
agglomeration benefit spread at various different levels (diagram 11), and that makes them so 
important in the entertainment industry. 
                                                 
20 See, for example, chapter 6 in Krugman and Obstfeld (2003). 
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Diagram 11. Stylised representation of the interlinked intra- and inter-industry webs of project-based 
entertainment industries 
 
An example is early film production which agglomerated in France in Paris and Nice, in 
Britain around London, and in the U.S. initially in New Jersey and later in Florida and California 
(Bakker 2008: 258-261). Until the mid-1920s, both intra- and inter-industry externalities were 
important. Production located close to theatrical districts such as London, Paris and New York. In 
the 1920s, however, the shift of the U.S. industry to Hollywood was driven solely by intra-
industry externalities. It was far from New York, where the studios’ corporate headquarters and 
distribution operations were.21 Later television and music production would also come to 
Hollywood, adding inter-industry co-location benefits. In the late twentieth century, the large 
and fast-growing Indian film industry became also highly concentrated geographically in 
Mumbai (Lorenzen and Mudambi 2012).22 
In recorded music, agglomeration was not always as strong as in motion pictures. In 
Europe, capital cities were important locations. For most styles, location was part of the brand 
image, and the music industry therefore agglomerated in many more locations, but with intra-
industry agglomeration benefits for specific styles, such as Nashville, Chicago or New York.  
The project-based characteristic contributed to this differentiation of locations. Also, 
because an industrial district lowered set-up costs, it could lead to ‘excess’ variety. 
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                 
21 For a detailed analysis of agglomeration benefits in the creative industries, and for present-day evidence 
of their importance, see Bakker (2010); for a historical analysis of Hollywood see Christopherson and 
Storper (1987). 
22 For a comparison of agglomeration in the Indian film and software industries in Mumbai and Bangalore, 
see Lorenzen and Mudambi (2012). 
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We started this essay with the question how we can explain long-run change in the 
entertainment industry. We discussed the process of industrialisation, creative destruction and 
shifting production possibility frontiers, and how to measure its impact through, for example, 
total factor productivity, revealed comparative advantage or variety. We discussed the relation 
between sunk costs, variety, industrialisation, dynamic product differentiation and price 
discrimination and the trade-off between variety, quality, quantity and efficiency. Finally, we 
identified four main economic tendencies (diagram 12): the importance of endogenous sunk 
costs that led to quality races, zero marginal costs leading to vertical integration, quasi-public 
good characteristics leading to business models focused on points-of-exclusion, and, finally, 
entertainment’s project-based character leading to agglomeration. 
Key insights included the need for price discrimination, vertical integration and business 
models protecting points-of-exclusion in the value chain to enable larger sunk outlays; and 
agglomeration to minimise costs and maximise effectiveness of those outlays. Old media 
survived by differentiating themselves, focusing on distinct, often narrower, audiences.  
 
Diagram 12. Major economic characteristics of the film industry and their dynamic and historical 
implications. 
 
Economic characteristic Dynamic implication Historical expressions 
Sunk costs Quality race Motion pictures 1910s and 
1970s/80s 
Music industry 1950/60s 
Videogames 2000s 
Marginal revenue = marginal 
profits 
Vertical integration Motion pictures: Europe 1900s; 
US 1910s 
Music: 1900s; 1960s 
Videogames: 2000s 
Quasi-public good character 
(non-diminishable but 
excludable) 
Income inequality (emergence 
star system and superstars) 
Business models 
Theatre 19th c.  
Motion pictures 1910s – 
Music 1910s ; 1950s  
Videogames: to come (?) 
Project-based character Agglomeration U.S. 1900s-1920s: Jacobs and 
Marshall externalities 
U.S. 1925-: Marshall 
externalities 
Europe: 1900s: Jacobs and 
Marshall externalities 
 
 
Intriguingly, old and new forms, big and small producers, homogenous vertically 
differentiated markets and diverse, horizontally differentiated markets all coexisted. Low and flat 
marginal costs and exogenous sunk costs, the simultaneity of horizontal and vertical  product 
differentiation and agglomeration benefits, led to excess variety, organised in a dual market 
structure, with one part offering fewer high-concept block-buster products, and the other part 
offering a flood of low-budget horizontally differentiated products.  
Clearly historical events interacted with economic forces, such as the quality races in film 
in the 1910s and the 1970s, in music in the 1950s and 1960s, motion pictures agglomeration in 
Hollywood in the late 1920s and music’s decentralised agglomeration in different locations since 
1955. 
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Implications for business include the need to either focus on horizontal or vertical 
differentiation; to find the best ways to price discriminate and to vertically integrate to increase 
sunk outlays, to develop business models focused on dominating the point-of-exclusion, to be 
alert to the signs that a quality race is about to begin, to locate within an industrial district to 
lower costs, to look out for shifts in the production possibility frontier, and, finally, to be aware 
of dual market structures and choose one of the two markets but not both. Sound and simple 
as these implications may sound, the path of the entertainment industry over the last two 
centuries is littered with the wrecks of firms that did not heed them.23 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Bakker (2007). 
34 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bakker, Gerben, ‘America’s Master: The Decline and Fall of the European Film Industry in 
the United States’, in: L. Passerini ed., Across the Atlantic (Brussels, Presses Inter-Universitaires 
Européennes / Peter Lang, 2000), 213-240. 
Bakker, Gerben, ‘Stars and Stories: How Films Became Branded Products’, Enterprise and 
Society 2 (2001), 461-502. 
Bakker, Gerben, ‘Building Knowledge about the Consumer: The Emergence of Market 
Research in the Motion Picture Industry’, Business History 45 (2003), 101-127. 
Bakker, Gerben, ‘Selling French films on Foreign Markets: The International Strategy of a 
Medium-Sized Company’, Enterprise and Society, Vol. 5 No. 1 (March 2004), 45-76. 
Bakker, Gerben, ‘The Decline and Fall of the European Film Industry: Sunk Costs, Market 
Size and Market Structure, 1895-1926’, Economic History Review 58 (2005), 310-351. 
Bakker, Gerben, “Strategic Intent, Survivor Bias and Long-Run Analysis: Non-U.S. 
Entrants in the Motion Picture Industry, 1895-2005,” unpublished ms., London School of 
Economics (2007). 
Bakker, Gerben, Entertainment Industrialised: The Emergence of the International Film 
Industry, 1890-1940 (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Bakker, Gerben, “The Evolution of the British Entertainment Business: Film, Music and 
Videogames,” in:  Learning from Some of Britain's Successful Sectors: An Historical Analysis of 
the Role of Government (London, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, BIS Economics 
Paper No. 6, 2010). 
Bakker, Gerben, (2011a) “Trading Facts: Arrow’s Fundamental Paradox and the Origins 
of Global News Networks” in: Peter Putnis, Chandrika Kaul and Juergen Wilke eds., 
Communication, News and Globalisation: Historical Studies (Hampton Press / International 
Association of Media and Communication Research, 2011). 
Bakker, Gerben, (2011b), ‘Adopting the Rights-Based Model: Music Multinationals and 
Local Music Industries since 1945’, Journal of Popular Music History, Vol. 6 No. 3 (2011), 307-
343. 
35 
 
Bakker, Gerben, 2012. ‘How Motion Pictures Industrialized Entertainment’. Journal of 
Economic History 72(4) (December): 1036–1063. 
Bakker, Gerben, 2013. ‘Soft Power: The Media and Creative Industries in Britain since 
1870’. In The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Paul Johnson, Jane Humphries 
and Roderick Floud. 4th edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baumol, William J., and William F. Bowen, Performing arts. The economic dilemma. A 
study of problems common to theatre, opera, music and dance (New York, Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1966).  
Broda, Christian and David E. Weinstein, “Globalization and the gains from 
variety,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 2006, 541-585. 
Carlton, Dennis W. and Jeffery M. Perloff, Modern industrial organization (Reading, 
Mass., Addison-Wesley, 3rd ed., 2000). 
Caves, Richard E., Creative industries. Contracts between art and commerce (Cambridge, 
Mass and London, Harvard University Press, 2000). 
Chamberlin, Edward, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1933). 
Chanan, Michael, The dream that kicks. The prehistory and early years of cinema in 
Britain (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, 1998). 
Christopherson, Susan, and Michael Storper, “Flexible specialisation and regional 
agglomerations: The case of the U.S. motion picture industry,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 77 (1987), 104-117. 
Courty, Pascal, "An economic guide to ticket pricing in the entertainment industry," 
Louvain Economic Review 66 (2000), 167-192. 
, "Some economics of ticket resale," Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2003), 85-
97. 
, "Ticket pricing under demand uncertainty," Journal of Law and Economics 46 
(2003), 627-652. 
36 
 
Cowen, Tyler, Creative destruction (Princeton University Press, 2002). 
, In praise of commercial culture (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1998). 
Crafts, Nicholas, "Revealed Comparative Advantage in Manufacturing, 1899-1950," 
Journal of European Economic History 18 (1989), 127-37. 
Dale, Martin, The movie game. The film business in Britain, Europe and America 
(London, Cassell, 1997). 
Dupuit, Jules, "On tolls and transport charges," Annales des Ponts et Chaussées, 2e série 
(1849), 1e semestre, 207-248, translation in International Economic Papers 11 (1962), 7-31. 
Ekelund, Robert B., "Price discrimination and product differentiation in economic theory: 
an early analysis," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970), 268-78. 
Haberler, G. 1930. “The Theory of Comparative Costs and Its Use in the Defense of Free 
Trade”, Selected Essays, 3-19. 
Heilbrun, James and C. M. Gray, The economics of art and culture (New York and 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; 2nd ed. 2001). 
Hofstede, Bart, Dutch Film Abroad: idenity and organisation of the Dutch film industry since 
1945 (Delft, Eburon, 2000). 
Huntington, Paul, "Ticket pricing policy and box office revenue," Journal of Cultural 
Economics 17 (1993), 71 - 87. 
Jacobs, Jane, The economy of cities (New York, Vintage Books, 1969) 
Jowett, Garth S., “The First Motion Picture Audiences,” Journal of Popular Film 3 (1974), 
39-45. 
Kirzner, Israel M., Discovery and the Capitalist Process (University of Chicago Press, 
1985). 
Krueger, Alan, "The Economics of Real Superstars: The Market for Concerts in the 
Material World," Journal of Labor Economics 23 (2005), 1-30. 
37 
 
Krugman, Paul R., “Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and international 
trade,” Journal of International Economics 9 (1979), 469-479. 
,  and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics. Theory and Policy (Reading, Mass., 
Addison-Wesley, 2003). 
Le Roy, Dominique, , Economie des arts du spectacle vivant. Essai sur la relation entre 
l'économie et l'esthétique (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1992). 
, Histoire des arts du spectacle en France. Aspects économiques, politiques et 
esthétiques de la Renaissance à la Première Guerre mondiale (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1990). 
Leslie, Philip, "Price discrimination in Broadway theater," Rand Journal of Economics 35 
(2004), 520-541. 
Lorenzen, Mark, and Ram Mudambi, “Clusters, connectivity and catch-up: Bollywood 
and Bangalore in the global economy,” Journal of Economic Geography (2012), pp. 1-34. 
Mezias, J. and S. Mezias, “Resource partitioning, the founding of specialist firms and 
innovation: The American feature film industry, 1912-1992,” Organization Science 11 (2000). 
Mitry, Jean, Histoire du cinéma. Art et industrie Vols. 1-5 (Paris, Editions Universitaires, 
1967-1980). 
Orbach, Barak Y. and Liran Einav, "Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods: The Case of 
the Movie-Theater Industry," International Review of Law and Economics, 2007. 
Robinson, Joan, The economics of imperfect competition (London, MacMillan, 2nd ed. 
1969; orig. ed. 1933) 
Romano, Richard E., ‘When excessive consumption is rational,” American Economic 
Review 81 (1991), 553-64. 
Rosen, Sherwin, “The economics of superstars,” American Economic Review 71 (1981), 
845-854. 
, and Andrew M. Rosenfeld, "Ticket pricing," Journal of Law and Economics 40 
(1997), 351-376. 
38 
 
Sadoul, Georges, Histoire générale du cinéma Vols. 1-6 (Paris, De Noël, 1948-1954). 
, Histoire du Cinéma Mondial (Paris, Flammarion, 9th edition, 1972). 
Sanderson, Michael, From Irving to Olivier. A social history of the acting profession in 
England, 1890-1980 (London, Athlone Press, 1984). 
Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, Allen and Unwin, 
1941). 
Scott, Allen J., On Hollywood: The Place, The Industry (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
Sedgwick, John, Popular film in 1930s Britain. A choice of pleasures (University of Exeter 
Press, 2000). 
, 'The nature of popular film as a commodity: the diffusion of film in Britain during the 
mid-1930s', Homo Oeconomicus, 17 (2001): 427-440. 
, “Product differentiation at the movies: Hollywood, 1946-65,” Journal of Economic 
History 63 (2002). 
Stigler, G. J., "The economics of information," Journal of Political Economy 69 (1961), 
213-225. 
Sutton, John, Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising and the 
Evolution of Concentration (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1991);  
, Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History (MIT Press, 1998). 
, “Competing in Capabilities: an Informal Overview,” Working Paper, London School 
of Economics, April 2005. 
Thompson, Kristin, Exporting entertainment. America in the world film market 1907-1934 
(London, British Film Institute, 1985). 
Throsby, C. D. and G. A. Wither, The economics of the performing arts (New York, St 
Martin's Press, 1979). 
Vessillier, Michèle, La crise du théâtre privé (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1973). 
39 
 
Vogel, Harold L., Entertainment industry economics. A guide for financial analysis 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Various editions, 1986-2010). 
Wasko, Janet, Movies and money. Financing the American film industry (Norwood, 
Ablex, 1982). 
Waterman, David, Hollywood's Road to Riches (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 2005). 
  
40 
 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
ECONOMIC HISTORY DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPERS  
(from 2009 onwards) For a full list of titles visit our webpage at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/  
 
 
2009 
 
WP114 War and Wealth: Economic Opportunity Before and After the Civil 
War, 1850-1870 
 Taylor Jaworski 
 
WP115 Business Cycles and Economic Policy, 1914-1945: A Survey 
 Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann 
 
WP116 The Impact of School Provision on Pupil Attendance: Evidence From the 
Early 20th Century 
 Mary MacKinnon and Chris Minns 
 
WP117 Why Easter Island Collapsed: An Answer for an Enduring Question 
 Barzin Pakandam 
 
WP118 Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship in Early 
Modern Europe 
 Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis 
 
WP119 Time and Productivity Growth in Services: How Motion Pictures 
Industrialized Entertainment 
 Gerben Bakker 
 
WP120 The Pattern of Trade in Seventeenth-Century Mughal India: Towards 
An Economic Explanation 
 Jagjeet Lally 
 
WP121 Bairoch Revisited. Tariff Structure and Growth in the Late 19th Century 
 Antonio Tena-Junguito 
 
WP122 Evolution of Living Standards and Human Capital in China in 18-20th 
Centuries: Evidences from Real Wage and Anthropometrics 
 Joerg Baten, Debin Ma, Stephen Morgan and Qing Wang 
 
WP123 Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925: in 
Comparison with Europe, Japan, and India 
 Robert C. Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine Moll-Murata, 
Jan Luiten van Zanden 
41 
 
 
WP124 Law and Economic Change in Traditional China: A Comparative 
Perspective 
 Debin Ma 
 
WP125 Leaving Home and Entering Service: The Age of Apprenticeship in Early 
Modern London 
 Patrick Wallis, Cliff Webb and Chris Minns 
 
WP126 After the Great Debasement, 1544-51: Did Gresham’s Law Apply? 
 Ling-Fan Li 
 
WP127 Did Globalization Aid Industrial Development in Colonial India? A Study 
of Knowledge Transfer in the Iron Industry 
 Tirthankar Roy 
 
WP128 The Education and Training of Gentry Sons in Early-Modern England 
 Patrick Wallis and Cliff Webb 
 
WP129 Does Trade Explain Europe’s Rise? Geography, Market Size and 
Economic Development 
 Roman Studer 
 
WP130 Depression Econometrics: A FAVAR Model of Monetary Policy During 
the Great Depression 
 Pooyan Amir Ahmadi and Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP131 The Economic Legacies of the ‘Thin White Line’: Indirect Rule and the 
Comparative Development of Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Peter Richens 
 
WP132 Money, States and Empire: Financial Integration Cycles and Institutional 
Change in Central Europe, 1400-1520 
 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP133 Regional Market Integration in Italy During the Unification (1832-1882) 
 Anna Missiaia 
 
2010 
 
WP134 Total Factor Productivity for the Royal Navy from Victory at Texal (1653) 
to Triumph at Trafalgar (1805) 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien FBA and Xavier Duran 
 
42 
 
WP135 From Sickness to Death: The Financial Viability of the English Friendly 
Societies and Coming of the Old Age Pensions Act, 1875-1908 
 Nicholas Broten 
 
WP136 Pirates, Polities and Companies: Global Politics on the Konkan Littoral, 
c. 1690-1756 
 Derek L. Elliott 
 
WP137 Were British Railway Companies Well-Managed in the Early Twentieth 
Century? 
 Nicholas Crafts, Timothy Leunig and Abay Mulatu 
 
WP138 Merchant Networks, the Baltic and the Expansion of European Long-
Distance Trade: Re-evaluating the Role of Voluntary Organisations 
 Esther Sahle 
 
WP139 The Amazing Synchronicity of the Global Development (the 1300s-
1450s). An Institutional Approach to the Globalization of the Late 
Middle Ages 
 Lucy Badalian and Victor Krivorotov 
 
WP140 Good or Bad Money? Debasement, Society and the State in the Late 
Middle Ages 
 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP141 Becoming a London Goldsmith in the Seventeenth Century: Social 
Capital and Mobility of Apprentices and Masters of the Guild 
 Raphaelle Schwarzberg 
 
WP142 Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and Military-
Fiscal Undertakings in an Eighteenth Century World Region 
 Tirthankar Roy 
 
WP143 Exotic Drugs and English Medicine: England’s Drug Trade, c.1550-
c.1800 
 Patrick Wallis 
 
WP144 Books or Bullion? Printing, Mining and Financial Integration in Central 
Europe from the 1460s 
 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP145 ‘Deep’ Integration of 19th Century Grain Markets: Coordination and 
Standardisation in a Global Value Chain 
 Aashish Velkar 
 
43 
 
WP146 The Utility of a Common Coinage: Currency Unions and the Integration 
of Money Markets in Late Medieval Central Europe 
 Lars Boerner and Oliver Volckart 
 
WP147 The Cost of Living in London, 1740-1837 
 Ralph Turvey 
 
WP148 Labour Market Dynamics in Canada, 1891-1911: A First Look From 
New Census Samples 
 Kris Inwood, Mary MacKinnon and Chris Minns 
 
WP149 Economic Effects of Vertical Disintegration: The American Motion 
Picture Industry, 1945 to 1955 
 Gregory Mead Silver 
 
 
2011 
 
WP150 The Contributions of Warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France to the Consolidation and Progress of the British Industrial 
Revolution 
 Patrick Karl O’Brien 
 
WP151 From a “Normal Recession” to the “Great Depression”: Finding the 
Turning Point in Chicago Bank Portfolios, 1923-1933 
 Natacha Postel-Vinay 
 
WP152 Rock, Scissors, Paper: the Problem of Incentives and Information in 
Traditional Chinese State and the Origin of Great Divergence 
 Debin Ma 
 
WP153 The Finances of the East India Company in India, c.1766-1859 
 John F. Richards 
 
WP154 Labour, law and training in early modern London:  apprenticeship and 
the city’s institutions 
 Patrick Wallis 
 
WP155 Why did (pre‐industrial) firms train? Premiums and apprenticeship 
contracts in 18th century England 
 Chris Minns, Patrick Wallis 
 
WP156 Merchantilist institutions for a first but precocious industrial revolution; 
The Bank of England, the Treasury and the money supply, 1694-1797 
Patrick O’Brien 
44 
 
 
2012 
 
WP157 Hand Looms, Power Looms, and Changing Production Organizations: 
The Case of the Kiryu Weaving District in the Early 20th Century Japan 
Tomoko Hashino, Keijuro Otsuka 
 
WP158 From Divergence to Convergence: Re-evaluating the History Behind 
China’s Economic Boom 
Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, Thomas G. Rawski 
 
WP159  Money and Monetary System in China in the 19th-20th Century: An 
Overview 
Debin Ma 
 
WP160  Contesting the Indigenous Development of"Chinese Double-entry 
Bookkeeping" and its Significance in China's Economic Institutions and 
Business Organization before c.1850 
Keith Hoskin, Richard Macve  
 
WP161 Steel, Style and Status: The Economics of the Cantilever Chair, 1929-
1936 
Tobias Vogelgsang 
 
WP162 The Seven Mechanisms for Achieving Sovereign Debt Sustainability  
Garrick Hileman  
WP163 Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in 
Germany 
Albrecht Ritschl 
 
WP164 Bounded Leviathan: or why North and Weingast are only right on the 
right half 
Alejandra Irigoin, Regina Grafe 
 
WP165 Monetary sovereignty during the classical gold standard era: the 
Ottoman Empire and Europe, 1880-1913  
Coşkun Tunçer 
 
WP166 Going Beyond Social Savings. How would the British economy have 
eveloped in the absence of the railways? A case study of Brunner 
Mond 1882-1914. 
Edward Longinotti 
 
WP167 Public Finance in Britain and China in the long Eighteenth Century 
Peer Vries 
45 
 
 
WP168 The rise of the patent department: A case study of Westinghouse 
Electric and Manufacturing Company 
Shigehiro Nishimura 
 
WP169 The Maghribi industrialists contract enforcement in the Moroccan 
industry, 1956-82 
 Romain Ferrali 
 
WP170  Adopting the rights-based model: music multinationals and local music 
industries since 1945  
Gerben Bakker 
 
 
WP171  The Eighth Wonder of the World: How might access for vehicles have 
prevented the economic failure of the Thames Tunnel 1843-1865? 
Rio Lydon 
 
